United States • June 29, 2026 • EPM Editorial Desk • 🌿 Progressive

Gulf Ceasefire That Isn't: Civilians Bear the Cost of 'New Normal'

As the U.S. and Iran trade airstrikes and maintain negotiations through Pakistan, former adviser Jake Sullivan's 'new normal' framing normalizes cycles of…

On June 27, AFP documented boats anchored off Oman's northern Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz as Iran launched attacks on U.S. positions in the Gulf, in response to American airstrikes. Washington had accused Tehran of attacking a U.S. cargo ship in the Strait. A U.S. official speaking anonymously to NPR confirmed that 'nothing has been canceled' regarding ongoing negotiations. Pakistan, acting as mediator, told the Associated Press that talks would resume Tuesday. Jake Sullivan, who served as President Biden's national security adviser and co-negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, used the phrase 'new normal' on NPR's Morning Edition to describe the current cycle of attacks and diplomatic engagement. ♟️ The play: The declared objective from Washington is nuclear non-proliferation. Sullivan, however, was candid that the real driver for the United States is avoiding 'having to restart a war that doesn't seem to have an end.' For the communities living along trade routes that cross the Strait of Hormuz, the distinction between a declared policy and a real one matters enormously. The 2015 JCPOA precedent is active, but that framework was built around state-level negotiations with minimal mechanisms for civilian impact assessment. The current process, mediated by Pakistan according to the AP, does not appear to have changed that framework. 🎯 Who gains: The Iranian government, as a state actor, gains direct access to sanctions relief and tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets, as Sullivan specified on NPR. For Tehran's leadership, that is a political and economic victory. The critical question Sullivan did not address is whether that relief will reach Iranian citizens or consolidate the resources of state structures. Gulf states, meanwhile, may gain negotiating autonomy by striking independent deals with Tehran, according to Sullivan. But autonomy for governments is not automatically autonomy or security for the people those governments represent. ⚠️ Who loses: The populations most exposed to the 'new normal' of intermittent strikes are those living and working along Gulf commercial corridors. Sullivan's framing acknowledges that this cycle of flare-ups and de-escalation is expected to continue without a definitive resolution. That means sustained uncertainty for communities dependent on Strait of Hormuz shipping routes. Sullivan also warned that U.S. influence is diminishing, which means the external actor most likely to attach human rights or humanitarian conditions to any deal becomes less relevant to the negotiating table. 📐 Next move: Civil society actors and governments with human rights mandates should demand that any agreement reached this week include verifiable humanitarian provisions, not only nuclear and sanctions terms. Washington should evaluate whether sanctions relief mechanisms are structured to reach Iranian civilian populations. Pakistan, as mediator, has an opening before Tuesday's talks to introduce that dimension. The immediate condition is the resumption of negotiations, confirmed by the AP for this week. 📌 EPM Take: The phrase Sullivan used, 'new normal,' deserves to be challenged rather than normalized. At EPM, we have covered how the Palestinian crisis and Armenian memory continue reshaping global debates about recognition and rights. The Gulf is another chapter of that same question: who has a voice in the security arrangements that determine their lives? The tens of billions in frozen Iranian assets represent a genuine economic opportunity, but without conditionality linked to civilian welfare, that capital can reinforce state structures without improving lives on the ground. The 2015 JCPOA contained no meaningful humanitarian benchmarks, and its collapse produced no accountability mechanism for the populations affected. The question readers should ask is not just whether a deal gets done, but whether anyone at the table is negotiating for the people who live there. ✍️ EPM Editorial Desk | erickprometeomedia.com

On June 27, Iran launched attacks against U.S. positions in the Gulf in response to American airstrikes, after Washington accused Tehran of attacking a U.S. cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz, per AFP. Negotiations nonetheless continue: a U.S. official speaking anonymously confirmed to NPR that 'nothing has been canceled.' Pakistan, the designated mediator, told the Associated Press that talks would resume Tuesday. Jake Sullivan, who served as national security adviser under President Biden and helped negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal, appeared on NPR's Morning Edition to assess the strategic landscape. His analysis revealed a power shift that deserves serious attention. ♟️ The play: Iran is executing a dual-track strategy that Sullivan described accurately on NPR: maintaining sufficient military pressure to demonstrate damage capability while retaining diplomatic availability. The declared objective is sanctions relief and access to frozen assets. The real objective, visible in Sullivan's own analysis, is structural leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, to negotiate from a position of strength rather than need. The 2015 JCPOA precedent is active, but today's regional architecture is fundamentally different: Gulf states are now identified by Sullivan himself as potential independent actors rather than aligned U.S. partners. 🎯 Who gains: Iran is the direct strategic beneficiary. Sullivan stated explicitly that the Strait of Hormuz agreement shifted leverage toward Tehran. Access to tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets, a figure Sullivan cited on NPR, represents a significant recapitalization of Iranian state power. Beyond the economic dimension, Sullivan's warning that Gulf states may negotiate independently with Tehran signals that Iran is on the verge of achieving regional legitimacy it could not obtain through military means alone. That is the real strategic prize: recognition as an indispensable regional power without requiring a formal peace agreement. ⚠️ Who loses: The United States faces a measurable and documented erosion of Gulf influence. Sullivan acknowledged directly that the Strait agreement shifted leverage to Iran and that Gulf states could strike independent deals, leaving Washington with less influence. These are not hypothetical risks; they are Sullivan's own assessments of the current trajectory. Every independent Gulf-Tehran bilateral arrangement that materializes reduces Washington's ability to impose unified conditions or coordinate collective responses. The deterrence architecture the United States built over decades in the Gulf is under structural pressure. 📐 Next move: Washington must arrive at this week's negotiations with a strategy that goes beyond conflict-avoidance and offers a credible leverage-restoration plan before Gulf states formalize independent arrangements with Tehran. Iran must demonstrate that de-escalation in the Strait is a strategic commitment, not a negotiating tactic. Pakistan must secure procedural guarantees that talks survive the next flare-up. The timeline is immediate: the AP confirmed negotiations resume this week, and each passing day without a framework creates space for independent bilateral movement. 📌 EPM Take: What Sullivan said on NPR, and what most coverage underweights, is a frank admission of strategic retreat. When a former U.S. national security adviser describes Washington's core motivation as avoiding a war 'that doesn't seem to have an end,' he is defining American policy by what it seeks to escape rather than what it seeks to achieve. That is a posture of exhaustion, not deterrence. The 2015 JCPOA failed in part because it did not resolve the regional leverage question. A decade later, that question has gotten harder: Gulf states now have the option to exit the U.S. coordination framework entirely. At EPM, we have reported on how federal institutional authority inside the United States faces simultaneous internal pressures. An administration managing domestic institutional strain while projecting conflict-avoidance abroad presents a signal that experienced counterparts in Tehran and regional capitals are fully equipped to interpret. The question that matters is whether the Trump administration has a defined strategy to restore Gulf leverage before the regional order reorganizes around a Tehran-centric architecture. ✍️ EPM Editorial Desk | erickprometeomedia.com

Entre bombas y mesas de negociación: vidas en juego en el Golfo

Mientras gobiernos negocian términos nucleares y sanciones, las poblaciones de la región del Golfo viven bajo una 'nueva normalidad' de ataques intermitentes…

El 27 de junio, mientras aviones de guerra cruzaban el Estrecho de Ormuz y la agencia AFP documentaba barcos anclados frente a la Península de Musandam en Omán, personas en ambos lados de la confrontación vivían las consecuencias de una escalada que sus gobiernos llaman 'normalidad'. Irán lanzó ataques contra posiciones estadounidenses en el Golfo tras bombardeos americanos, luego de que Washington acusara a Teherán de atacar un buque de carga en el Estrecho de Ormuz. Un funcionario estadounidense anónimo le dijo a NPR que 'nada ha sido cancelado' respecto a las negociaciones. Pakistan, mediador en el proceso, confirmó a la Associated Press que las conversaciones se reanudarían el martes. ♟️ La jugada: El actor principal, Washington, busca declaradamente un acuerdo nuclear que prevenga la proliferación. Pero el objetivo real, según el exasesor de seguridad nacional Jake Sullivan en NPR, es evitar 'tener que reiniciar una guerra que no parece tener fin'. Esa distinción importa: significa que la política exterior no está impulsada por un proyecto positivo para las poblaciones de la región, sino por la lógica de contención del daño. El precedente activado es el JCPOA de 2015, pero las condiciones humanitarias y económicas que las sanciones han generado sobre la población iraní no forman parte central del marco de negociación visible. 🎯 Quien gana: Irán, como Estado, gana alivio de sanciones y acceso a decenas de miles de millones de dólares en activos congelados, según Sullivan. Para el gobierno de Teherán, eso representa una victoria política. Sin embargo, la pregunta que pocos formulan es si ese alivio económico llegará a la población iraní o reforzará principalmente las estructuras de poder interno. El gobierno iraní, no la ciudadanía ordinaria, es el beneficiario directo del leverage adquirido en el Estrecho de Ormuz, según el análisis de Sullivan. ⚠️ Quien pierde: Las poblaciones civiles en zonas de influencia del conflicto, incluyendo rutas comerciales vitales para economías dependientes del Golfo, cargan con la incertidumbre de una 'nueva normalidad' de ataques intermitentes. Sullivan advirtió que los estados del Golfo podrían cerrar tratos propios con Teherán. Eso no es solo un movimiento geopolítico: significa que comunidades enteras en esa región vivirán bajo marcos de seguridad negociados sin su participación directa. La influencia reducida de EE.UU. no garantiza automáticamente mejores condiciones para quienes habitan la región. 📐 Siguiente movimiento: Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y los gobiernos que abogan por derechos en la región deben exigir que cualquier acuerdo incluya cláusulas verificables sobre condiciones humanitarias. Washington debe evaluar si el alivio de sanciones tiene mecanismos que beneficien a la población iraní, no solo al Estado. Pakistán, como mediador, tiene la oportunidad de introducir esa dimensión antes del martes. El plazo es esta semana, con las negociaciones en curso. 📌 Conclusión EPM: La frase de Sullivan, 'la nueva normalidad', merece ser interrogada con rigor. Normalizar ciclos de ataque y tregua sin acuerdo definitivo tiene un costo humano que no aparece en los cables diplomáticos. En EPM hemos cubierto cómo la memoria armenia y la crisis palestina continúan redefiniendo el debate global sobre derechos y reconocimiento. El Golfo es otro capítulo de esa misma pregunta: ¿quién tiene voz en los acuerdos que determinan su seguridad? Los decenas de miles de millones de dólares en activos congelados que Irán podría recuperar representan una oportunidad real, pero también un riesgo: sin condiciones vinculadas a bienestar civil, ese dinero puede consolidar regímenes sin mejorar vidas. La pregunta que importa no es solo si habrá acuerdo nuclear, sino para quién se negocia la paz. ✍️ EPM Editorial Desk | erickprometeomedia.com

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